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ames Wilson’s theory of constitutional interpretation is based on a multidimensional view of sovereignty, both principled and derived. While the
American people serve as the principle sovereign, they delegate authority
to the Court (their agents) to uphold the Constitution and educate the
American people about the Constitution, its principles, and the duties of
the sovereign people. In rendering their decisions, Wilson argues that judges should
apply principles of common sense natural law and natural right that informed the
sovereign people’s original understanding of the Constitution. By applying Wilson’s multidimensional concept of sovereignty, the role of the judge can be used as
a guide to understanding Wilson’s overall theory of constitutional interpretation.
According to Wilson (2007, 304), a constitution is
that supreme law, made or ratified by those in whom sovereign
power of the state resides, which prescribes the manner, according
to which the state wills that government should be instituted and
administered. From this constitution the power of government must
be directed and controlled: of this constitution no alteration can be
made by government; because such an alteration would destroy the
foundation of its own authority.
Wilson’s definition of a constitution relies upon the idea of sovereignty as
a multi-dimensional concept, based on a principle-agent relationship. The
Constitution is the supreme law. The people, as principle sovereign, both
make the Constitution, and will their power to the agents of the government
which they have created. These agents are designed to pursue the will of the
people, and limited by the division of powers, and the boundaries set in the
Constitution, in order to prevent tyranny. According to this logic, a judge
serves as an agent of the people. A judge is to represent the wants and interests
of the people. However, the nature of a judge cannot be treated the same as
the nature of a representative in Congress. Representatives in Congress are
supposed to be the most accurate voice of the people, with little or no alteration. Judges, on the other hand, are entrusted with the job of upholding the
Constitution, while simultaneously educating the people on the law. Therefore, they can be considered as agents-plus. Judges serve as both an agent and
educator of the principle sovereign, aiding the people in understanding their
position as principle sovereign. Judges help educate the people to make them
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better citizens through their decision making and interpretation of the Constitution (Zink 2009).
Here, I address Wilson’s conception of judges as an agents-plus
in three different roles. The first role is as agents. Judges are
not to serve as political agents, in order to preserve the proper
balance between the three branches of government. Wilson
stresses the importance of an independent judiciary in completing the duties necessary of judges. Wilson also believes that
as agents, judges should rely on scientific reasoning when making their decisions. The second role is as representatives. Wilson designates three jobs for judges as a representative: (1) Not
to make law, but to interpret it in light of the Constitution,
(2) To promote a true science of law and to follow precedent
grounded on scientific principles instead of Aristotelian prudence, and (3) Judicial review must be textually based. The
third role is as educators. According to Wilson, judges have
the social responsibility of educating the people (the principle
sovereign) through their judicial decisions. This education not
only clarifies the Constitution and the law, but also serves to
educate the people about the nature of their responsibilities as
principle sovereign. Included in this is Wilson’s concept of the
moral sentiment, and its relationship with reason (the science
of law). Wilson clarifies this relationship with his idea of judgment and its relationship with reflection, memory, and reason.
Judges as Agents
Since judges are representatives of the people, it is important
that they are independent from the other branches of government. Wilson (2007, 704) argues that the Courts “ought to be
completely independent… They should be removed from the
most distant apprehension of being affected, in their judicial
character and capacity, by anything, except their own behavior
and consequences.” Important to Wilson is that judges are not
political agents. Where the executive and legislative branches
have popularly elected members, either directly or indirectly,
they become political agents that are restrained by the will of
the people. This forces political agents to change their platform
according to trends in the general populace. Since Supreme
Court judges are appointed for life, they do not have concern
with reelection, and therefore can make their decisions according to the Constitution. This does not mean that judges are not
agents of the people, it simply means that they are held above
the fray of politics, and serve only to protect the Constitution,
which is the original expression of the people’s will. Wilson
asks:
Can dignity and independence be expected from
judges, who are liable to be tossed about by every
veering gale of politics, and who can be secured from
destruction, only by dexterously swimming along with
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every successive tide of party? Is there not reason to
fear, that in such a situation, the decisions of courts
would cease to be the voice of law and justice, and
would become the echo of faction and violence?
(Wilson 2007, 704-05)
The independence of the courts is crucial to maintaining a
boundary between not only the three branches, but between
the courts and politics. Since the Court is not supposed to be
a political body, its authority and power is very constricted.
Hamilton describes this issue stating “The judiciary, on the
contrary, has no influence over the sword or the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of society; and
can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to
have neither force nor will, but merely judgment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the
efficacy of its judgments” (Federalist #78, 402). The Court’s
authority relies upon the Constitution, rather than the current
politics of society. This jurisdiction allows for judges to take on
the responsibility of maintaining the Constitution, and most
importantly, maintaining the boundaries between the three
branches.
Maintaining these boundaries is one of the Supreme Court’s
most important jobs. Wilson (2007, 705) states “Liberty and
security in government depend not on the limits, which the
rulers may please to assign to the exercise of their own powers,
but on the boundaries, within which their powers are circumscribed by the constitution.” The enforcement of boundaries
ensures that government will not become tyrannical. The most
important boundary to enforce is between the judicial and the
legislative departments. Wilson (2007. 743) argues “In consequence of it, the bounds of the legislative power – a power
the most apt to overleap its bounds – are not only distinctly
marked in the system itself; but effectual and permanent provision is made, that every transgression of those bounds shall be
adjudged and rendered vain and fruitless.”Using the power of
judicial review, the Court can strike down a law if it conflicts
with the Constitution. This allows the judiciary to maintain
this boundary between the two branches. Wilson (2007, 743)
explains when he states “This regulation is far from throwing
any disparagement upon the legislative authority of the United
States. It does not confer upon the judicial department a power
superior, in its general nature, to that of the legislature; but it
confers upon it, in particular instances, and for particular purposes, the power of declaring and enforcing the superior power
of the constitution – the supreme law of the land.”According
to Wilson, an act should be declared unconstitutional by the
Supreme Court if it violates the spheres of power (on an institutional level), or if it usurps power for the legislature. James
Madison shares the same sentiment on the maintenance of
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boundaries in order to prevent the usurpation of power by another branch. Madison discusses tyranny as “the accumulation
of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective” (Federalist #47, 249). In addition to the threat of tyranny, Madison discusses the concept of
factions in a majoritarian society. Madison states “the society
itself will be broken into many parts, interests, and classes of
citizens, that the rights of individuals, or of the minority, will
be in little danger from interested combinations of the majority” (Federalist #51, 270). One of Madison’s biggest fears was
the creation of a majority faction. The division of power, and
the maintenance and enforcement of those divisions prevents
against majority faction, and protects the interests of the minority. The enforcement of boundaries serves to maintain the
Constitution is and always will be the supreme law, in which
no branch of government can infringe upon.
In the case where the Constitution does not provide clear guidance, or consists of conflicting protections, judges should be
entrusted to make equitable decisions. Wilson relies upon Aristotle’s definition of equity, which is “the correction of that,
in which the law is defective, by being too general” (Wilson
2007, 924). According to Wilson’s understanding, the science
of law is used to educate a judge on justice and equity. Wilson
responds to arguments calling for separate courts of law and
equity by arguing that equity is an inherent aspect and concern of the law and that the two cannot be separated. Wilson
(2007,925) critiques the British system, stating “When we find
a court of law and a court of equity placed in contradistinction
to each other, how natural is it to conclude, that the former
decide without equity, and that the latter decides without law.
Such a conclusion, however, is greatly erroneous.” He describes
the combination of a court of equity and a court of law when
interpreting constitutional issues stating:
It has, indeed, been said, concerning a court of equity,
that it determines by the spirit, and not by the letter
of a rule. But ought not this to be said concerning a
court of law likewise? Is not each equally bound – does
not each profess itself to be equally bound – to explain the law according to the intention of those, who
made it? In the interpretation of laws, whether strictly
or liberally, there is not a single maxim, which is not
adopted, in the same manner, and with the same force,
by both courts. Hitherto, then, we find no difference
between a court of law and a court of equity. (Wilson
2007, 925)
Although others have tried to make the argument that courts
of equity and law should remain separate entities, Wilson does
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

not agree. Wilson (2007, 933-34) states “law and equity are
in a state of continual progression; one occupying incessantly
the ground, which the other, in its advancement, has left. The
posts now possessed by strict law were formerly possessed by
equity; and the posts now possessed by equity will hereafter be
possessed by strict law.” Here, Wilson appears to separate law
and equity on the one hand, and science on the other. Science
is grounded and proven, and informed by reason. This supports
the theory of Hobbes, who believes scientific reasoning should
be applied to the law. Hobbes (1994, 26) says “reason is the
pace; increase of science, the way; and the benefit of mankind,
the end.” This suggests that both Hobbes and Wilson believe
the use of scientific reasoning is the driving force which should
solidify the law, justice and equity. For Wilson, applying scientific reasoning with equity helps to aid judges in translating
the Constitution while simultaneously improving society. This
idea of equity is also consistent with Hobbes. Hobbes defines
equity in the role of a judge as “a precept of the law of natural
that he deal equally between them. For without that, the controversies of men cannot be determined but by war” (Hobbes
1994, 97). In a similar sentiment, Wilson (2007, 934) states
“equity may be well deemed the conductor of law towards a
state of refinement and perfection.” The idea of equity serving
as a tool to refining and perfecting society, also suggests that
equity can serve as an end of government and society. While
Wilson attributes the creation of government as the agent for
the will of the people, equity can serve as one of the ends government is designated to achieve.
Judges as Representatives
The second job of judges is to serve as representatives of the will
of the people. On this front, Wilson identifies three important
jobs designated for judges. The first is that they should not
make the law (Wilson 2007, 738). Making the law is the job
of the legislature. Judges have only the function of interpreting
the law in light of the Constitution. Wilson (2007, 738) argues
“In the United States, the judges stand upon the sure basis of
the constitution: the judicial department is independent of the
legislature.” A judge can determine the constitutionality of the
law, and strike it down with the power of judicial review, if and
only if it is found to be unconstitutional. A judge has no other
power to strike down a law other than this power, limiting their
ability to create the law. However, Wilson(2007, 738) argues “In
many cases, the jurisdiction of the judges of the United States
is ascertained and secured by the constitution; as to these, the
power of the judicial is coordinate with that of the legislative
department.” The coordination between the legislative branch
and the judiciary was of particular importance to Wilson. Since
the judiciary serves as the final check on a new law, judges must
coordinate with lawmakers in order to best serve the needs of
society, in accordance with the Constitution.1
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The second role of judges as representatives is that judges
“should implement ‘principles and rules of genuine policy and
natural justice’ for the purpose of promoting a true science of
law” (Wilson 2007, xxiii). According to Wilson, the term “science” is viewed as progress in reflection of enlightenment principles. For Wilson, the use of precedent is seen as necessary,
but not in every situation. Each new case and new decision
improves upon or uses precedent, almost like a science experiment. In science, a result is only deemed legitimate if it can be
replicated. This is the same for the law. If precedent cannot be
applied to more than one case that is similar in nature, then the
decision should be improved upon and changed. Wilson uses
his knowledge of the natural sciences and applies them to the
law using the writings of Lord Francis Bacon. Wilson describes
the science of law while mentioning the importance of Lord
Bacon in the following:
I think I may venture the position – that in no science
can richer materials be found, and that, in no science,
have rich materials been more neglected or abused,
than in the science of law – particularly of the common law. Listen to the sentiments of my Lord Bacon,
in his book on the advancement of learning. It is well
known, that the vast object of this exalted and most
comprehensive genius was, to erect a new and lasting
fabric of philosophy, founded, not on hypothesis or
conjecture, but on experience and truth. To the accomplishment of this design, it was necessary that he
should previously review, in all its provinces and divisions, the state of learning as it then stood. To do this
effectually required knowledge and discernment, exquisite and universal; such were happily employed in
the arduous task. (Wilson 2007, 1026-1027)
The use of science for Wilson is very important in the interpretation, as well as the teaching of the law. Wilson looks towards
the law, as well as the interpretation of it, as an advancement
of learning. Applying the science of law is important to the
overall job of judges, because they are entrusted with clarifying
the law of the Constitution for the people. The science of law
serves as a way of improving the existing law, as well as an aid
in interpreting what the law intends through replication. The
use of science and the emphasis on replication suggests that
through the use of scientific principles and reason, a judge can
better clarify the law, leading to uniformity in the interpretation of it. If interpretation of the law, and more importantly
the Constitution, is more uniform, it will be easier to educate
the people on its meaning. This also supports Wilson’s idea
that the law and its application is universal in nature, which
should facilitate, on one hand, the perfection of society and the
cultivation of American citizens, on the other. For example, if
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similar laws are interpreted differently in two different states,
then two different lessons are learned by the people. This works
against Wilson’s national impulse. Therefore, for Wilson, a scientific grounding for precedent is surer than the grounding of
precedent currently and historically found in the common law.
The science of law also helps to maintain the idea of the judiciary as a pyramid. The courts, according to Wilson (2007,
945) should resemble a pyramid where there is “a regular, progressive gradation of jurisdiction.” The gradation of jurisdiction provides options, as well as limits them. The higher up the
pyramid, the more limited the power of the Court becomes.
This is helpful in maintaining the boundaries of the Supreme
Court. Giving the Supreme Court the final authority is potentially dangerous, therefore the pyramid provides limitations
on the Court’s power.2 The potential danger is seen in the fact
that the Court is not popularly elected, and is not accountable
for its decisions. The fear is that an empowered court could
degenerate into an aristocracy. In addition to this, he states “a
supreme court prohibits the abuse, and protects the exercise, of
every inferior judiciary power” (Wilson 2007, 945). The creation of the United States judicial system allows for the science
of law to function properly. Each district has its own federal
court, and appellate court to which the law is interpreted and
applied. However, the Supreme Court has the ultimate authority, and makes the ultimate decision of whether or not a decision, or law is constitutional.
The third responsibility of a judge as representative is that judicial review should always been textually based (Wilson 2007,
xxiii). This should be seen as a limitation. Although the power
of judicial review is an implicit power with the function of
ascertaining the validity of a statute, Wilson limits this implicit
power by requiring judge’s decisions involving judicial review
to be strictly text based. Since the Constitution is the supreme
law of the land, and is the will of the sovereign people, Wilson
believes it provides the proper criteria for making this determination. Wilson (2007, 897) describes judicial review as:
If the validity of a statute or treaty of the United States,
or of an authority exercised under them, be drawn in
question, in any suit in the highest court of law or
equity of a state, in which a decision of the suit could
be had; and a decision is against their validity – if the
validity of a statute of any state, or of an authority
exercised under that state, is, in any suit in such court,
drawn in question, as repugnant to the constitution,
treaties or laws of the United States; and a decision is
in favor of their validity – if the construction of any
clause of the constitution, of a treaty, of a statute of the
United States, or of a commission held under them, is,
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

in any suit in such court, drawn in question; and a decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption,
specially set up or claimed by either party under such
clause – a final judgment or decree, in all these cases,
may, upon a writ of error, be reexamined and affirmed
or reverse in the supreme court of the United States.
The power of judicial review is used when the Constitution is
not clear about a certain issue, or if there are conflicting principles. Grounding judicial review in text also limits the power
of the Supreme Court from overstepping their jurisdictional
boundaries. It also allows for a legitimate check on the acts of
the legislature. In recognition of this, Hamilton refers to the
judicial branch as an “intermediate body between the people
and the legislature, in order, among other things, to keep the
latter within the limits assigned to their authority” (Federalist #78, 404). Maintaining the proper balance between the
three branches of government constitutes a significant part of a
judge’s responsibilities. A judge wants to promote a true science
of law, and reach natural justice according to Wilson, therefore
the power of judicial review works towards that goal, by refining the wants and needs of the people, by limiting them with
the Constitution. Hamilton, picking up on this point, goes
further and says “the interpretation of the laws is the proper
and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is in fact,
and must be, regarded by the judges as fundamental law. It
therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning as well as
the meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body” (Federalist #78, 404). Judicial review stands as the
strongest check against legislative encroachment, and aides in
the enforcement of boundaries between these two branches.
Judges as Educators
The third function of a judge is to serve as an educator of the
sovereign people. Judges are entrusted with this education,
because they are seen as knowledgeable individuals, enlightened by studying the law and what Wilson refers to as the science of law. In the example that the people ask Congress to
do something that is outside the government’s derived power,
or is inconsistent with the ends of government, the Court has
the job of recognizing that this is unconstitutional, and has
the job of educating the people on why what they are asking is
inconsistent with the ends of government as designated by the
Constitution. Wilson (2007, 447-48) describes a judge as “He
who is qualified to teach, is well qualified to judge; and he, who
is well qualified to judge, is well qualified to teach.” According to Wilson, a judge has the social responsibility of bettering
society. A judge does this by educating the people on the law
through their decisions.
When interpreting the Constitution, judges use what WilBridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

son (2007, 819) refers to as “common sense.” This “common
sense” is informed by Wilson’s concept of the moral sentiment,
which is used to resolve the tension between natural right principles and common law principles. Wilson (2007, 458) states
that when making decisions, a judge must “pry into the secret
recesses of the human heart, and become well acquainted with
the whole mortal world, that they may discover the abstract
reason of all laws.” This implies two important concepts for
Wilson. When he refers to “the secret recesses of the human
heart,” he is referring to the moral sentiment. Wilson (2007,
512) states that the moral sentiment “from its very nature, is intended to regulate and control all our other powers. It governs
our passions as well as our actions.” For Wilson (2007,512),
the concept of the moral sentiment is “In short; if we had not
the faculty of perceiving certain things in conduct to be right,
and others to be wrong; and of perceiving our obligation to do
what is right, and not to do what is wrong; we should not be
moral and accountable beings.” Therefore, according to Wilson, the moral sentiment serves as our internal check on right
and wrong, placed in the hearts of individuals by God.
Another way of conceptualizing the moral sense is as conscience.
This is an important quality of a judge, because judges require
the proper understanding of right and wrong while making decisions. According to Wilson (2007, 514), “His conscience or
moral sense determines the end, which he ought to pursue; and
he has intuitive evidence that his end is good: but the means
of attaining this end must be determined by reason.” Reason
is the second part of Wilson’s understanding of the “common
sense,” as well as judicial decision making. Once a judge has
consulted with the moral sense to determine what is right or
just, they must use reason in order to execute what the moral
sense is telling them to do. Wilson (2007, 514) states “Thus,
though good and ill, right and wrong are ultimately perceived
by the moral sense, yet reason assists its operations, and, in
many instances, strengthens and extends its influence.” Reason
and the moral sense work together to find the best possible outcome for a situation. The moral sense cannot act without reason, because reason provides what the moral sense cannot. Wilson (2007, 514-515) states “reason serves to illustrate, to prove,
to extend, to apply what our moral sense has already suggested
to us, concerning just and unjust, proper and improper, right
and wrong,” while in addition, “reason contributes to ascertain
the exactness, and to discover and correct the mistakes, of the
moral sense… It considers the relations of actions, and traces
them to the remotest consequences.” However, this is not to
suggest that reason is superior to the moral sense. According
to Wilson (2007, 519), “the ultimate ends of human actions,
can never, in any case, be accounted for by reason.” However,
the fault of reason is that it “presents false appearances to our
moral sense” (Wilson 2007, 518). Although it may seem that
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reasoning can be used to solve an issue in the natural sciences,
in the science of law, the moral sentiment is required. According to Wilson (2007,517), “the dictates of reason are neither
more general, nor more uniform, nor more certain, nor more
commanding, than the dictates of the moral sense.” Therefore,
it is important, given the strengths and weaknesses of both the
moral sense and reason separately, that the two work together.
According to Wilson’s conception of the moral sense, it
would seem that using a pure science of law if inadequate
when making decisions. Wilson believes good judges need
the combination of the science of law and the moral sense
in order to arrive at the right decision. Wilson (2007, 469)
asserts “Truth may, indeed, by reasoning, be rendered evident
to the understanding; but it cannot reach the heart, unless by
means of the imagination.” This suggests that science is silent
on the question of right and wrong. However, the moral sense
also cannot be the only influence on judicial decision making
either. Wilson (2007, 470) states “Laws may be promulgated
by reason and conscience, the divine monitors within us.”
Both coordinate with one another in order to arrive at a just
and equitable decision. The moral sense, without the use of
reason appears to have no restrictions. This tension between
the moral sense and the science of law is solved by Wilson’s
conception of judgment.
The first important part of Wilson’s conception of judgment
is reflection. Wilson believes that experience, as well as reflection on the experience of others is a very important influence
on judicial decision making. Wilson (2007, 586) describes the
action of reflection: This way: “By this power, the mind makes
its own operations the subject of its attention, and views and
examines them on every side.” While reasoning and the moral
sense both used when making decisions, reflection serves as the
best restriction against the passions of the moral sense. Wilson (2007, 586) states “how utterly impossible is it to make
any clear and distinct observations on our faculties of thought,
unless the passions, as well as the imagination, be silent and
still.” Once reflection has restricted the overbearing passions
the moral sense can sometimes present, one can apply the science of law and come to a decision that is consistent with the
dictates of natural justice. Reflection allows for the discovery
of truth, and therefore the right and best answer for a given
situation.
A second component of Wilson’s conception of judgment is
the relationship between judgment and memory. According
to Wilson (2007, 599), “Judgments are intuitive, as well as
discursive, founded on truths that are self-evident, as well as
that are deduced from demonstration, or from reasoning of a
less certain kind. The former, or intuitive judgments, may, in
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the strictest sense, be called the judgments of nature.” When
Wilson refers to demonstration, he is referring to experience,
or memory. According to Wilson, judgment and memory are
mutual assistants. Wilson (2007, 597) states “Memory furnishes the materials which judgment selects, adjusts, and arranges.
Those materials selected, adjusted and arranged are more at
the call of memory than before: for it is a well known fact,
that those things, which are disposed most methodically and
connected most naturally, are the most distinct, as well as the
most lasting objects of remembrance: hence, in discourse, the
utility as well as beauty of order.” Without memory, judges
would not have the ability to collect and organize information
in a particular case. Memory also allows for reflection, not only
on personal experience, but also on evidence and precedent.
Judgment uses memory in order to make affirmative or denial
distinctions. This ability is keen when relying upon the moral
sense for a scale of right and wrong. Wilson (2007, 599) describes judgment as “an important operation of the mind; and
it is employed upon the material of perception and knowledge.
It is generally described to be, that act of the mind, by which
one thing is affirmed or denied of another.” However, he believes this definition is too limited, while at the same time too
extensive. Wilson sees judgment as limited, because it can only
be expressed by either affirmation or denial. There is no true
gray area. He believes it is too extensive because it includes
testimony as a conjuncture to judgment, when they are two
completely different concepts with different implications.
Judgment, in addition to memory, requires reasoning in order
to function.
The third component of judgment for Wilson is the connection between judgment and reason. Wilson (2007, 600) states
that “with the power of judging, the power of reasoning is
very neatly connected.” Wilson sees judgment and reasoning
as corresponding with one another in order to reach the right
decision. This coincides with Aristotle’s practical judgment
(See Ethics, 1142a-1142b). According to Wilson (2007, 600),
“reasoning is strictly the process, by which we pass from one
judgment to another, which is the consequence of it. In all
reasoning, there must be one proposition, which is inferred,
and another, at least, from which the inference is made.” Reasoning is the bridge between memory and judgment. Reasoning allows for judgment to make the necessary connections,
and helps to organize and analyze the information contained
within memories. This organization allows for a judge to think
about memories in a restrained form. This restrained form is
less likely to be overly passionate, and can aid a judge in his/
her decision making in a clear and logical sense. However, Wilson (2007, 600) points out that “reason, as well as judgment,
has truth and falsehood for its objects: both proceed from evidence; both are accompanied with belief.” Therefore, accordBridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

ing to Wilson, reasoning and judgment cannot stand alone.
Both have the ability to reach the wrong conclusion. Wilson’s
solution to this is the moral sense. Wilson (2007, 803) states
“Our knowledge of moral philosophy, of natural jurisprudence, of the law of nations, must ultimately depend, for its
first principles, on the evidence and information of the moral
sense.” The combination of the moral sense with judgment
and reason is very important in understanding and interpreting the Constitution. According to Wilson (2007, 615), the
Constitution contains common sense moral principles. The
Constitution does not explicitly state these principles, but it is
required of a judge to identify them using reason. One of the
strongest common sense moral principles contained within the
Constitution is the protection of the innocent. Wilson (2007,
627-28) states “the moral sense restrains us from harming the
innocent: it teaches us, that the innocent have a right to be secure from harm. These are two great principles, which prepare
us for society; and with regard to them, the moral sense discovers peculiar inflexibility: it dictates, that we should submit to
any distress or danger, rather than procure our safety and relief
of violence upon an innocent person.” The Constitution deals
with common sense moral principles in a limited approach. It
places restraints upon individuals in society through the use of
a common sense. Each individual has a common, moral sentiment that tells them what is right and wrong placed in them
by God. The Constitution, as well as the governmental institutions it creates, is intended to inform the people on this moral
sentiment, and aid them in discovering it. The Constitution
cannot simply be looked at as the will of the people, but as the
will of the people that embodies and presumes and argument
on certain moral principles.
Discussion
Having distilled Wilson’s theory of how judges make decisions,
it can now be placed alongside the other schools of thought.
Although each has similar qualities to Wilson’s thought, each
has significant differences as well. The first school is the natural law. According to the natural law, law and morality cannot
be divorced from one another. The natural law also provides
principles for how one ought to live, based on substantive
moral reasoning that defines right and wrong. The natural law
is universal, but not in the same sense as Wilson understands
universality. Arkes (1990) and George (1999) attempt to incorporate Thomistic natural law principles into a theory of jurisprudence, where Wilson grounds a theory of jurisprudence
on scientific principles. Since the natural law argument focuses
on the Thomistic idea of right and wrong, Wilson does not fit
within its confines. Wilson believes that God has placed within
each individual the dictates of right and wrong, he uses common sense, the moral sentiment, and reasoning rather than a
strict reliance on the divine. Wilson focuses on the common
BridgEwater State UNIVERSITY

sense, reaching inside ourselves for the dictates of morality. The
traditional natural law argument, in contrast, argues that the
source of natural law is external to man, in the form of a divine
God. For Wilson, the natural law does not provide a thorough
basis for decision making, but instead creates a very limited
understanding of right and wrong based on divine reasoning.
The second school is natural right. According to natural rights
theorists, if a law is against natural rights, judges should reject it
as government has the job of protecting the inalienable rights of
individuals. Natural rights theorists also believe that legitimacy
in government is gained by the proper protection of rights,
not the consent of the governed. Barnett (2004, 30) states “a
duty to obey the law cannot be grounded on the consent of the
governed when there has been anything less than unanimous
consent and that, obviously, no government legal system can
claim this degree of consent.” According to the natural rights
argument, the job of government is to secure individual rights,
unless everyone, unanimously, can all agree that government
does not have the means to execute a given action. Barnett goes
on to claim that the phrase “We the People,” is a fiction, as well
as the idea of popular sovereignty itself. This idea is in direct
tension with Wilson’s idea of popular sovereignty. Wilson’s political thought focuses heavily on the importance of consent,
as well as the people as principle sovereign. Wilson agrees that
the government, as an agent of the people, and as part of their
social responsibility should protect individual’s natural rights
and improve society. This implies a trust between the sovereign
people that the government will actively protect their natural
rights. For Wilson, the government is simultaneously empowered and limited by this trust. For Barnett and other natural
rights theorists, the government is limited. Natural rights theorists also believe that popular attachment is based on what an
individual’s conscience dictates. If an individual believes a law,
or the government is not protecting them properly, they have
the right to deny/disobey that law. Wilson would disagree with
this concept of political attachment, given the multiple provisions provided in the Constitution to ensure that the laws created and passed by the legislature will be good laws. However,
Wilson would agree that conscience is a necessary factor in determining right and wrong. Wilson’s moral sentiment, based
on common sense principles, provides guidance on right and
wrong, in the same way individual conscience does.
The third school is of the common law in America. According
to Stoner (1992), the common law requires judges to make
decisions using prudence and precedent. A heavy reliance on
precedent allows for judges to make decisions based on the prior decisions of other judges, while accounting for new evidence
presented within a case. Wilson agrees with the use of precedent, but does not place a heavy reliance upon it. The com2014 • The undergraduate Review • 43

mon law is adaptable, changing with each generation to fit the
needs of the people. The common law is unwritten, therefore
allowing for flexibility. For Wilson, the common law does not
provide a solid basis for judicial decision making. Instead, Wilson favors grounding the Constitution and its interpretation
on scientific principles. Science is proven. The common law
is dynamic and unstable. Although the common law has been
perfected over time, science allows for replication. The common law does not rely on scientific reasoning, and is therefore
nonreplicable. This creates tension within the law, and therefore a problem with popular attachment to the law. This tension is commonly seen within interstate law. If a given action is
legal in one state, but illegal in another, the people can become
confused, therefore undermining the ability of the sovereign
people to perform their responsibilities. If the law is universal,
and grounded on scientific principles, it will be more solidified,
and therefore the people will be more likely to consent to it.

George, Robert P. 2001. In Defense of Natural Law. New York, NY:
Oxford University Press.

Wilson’s position on judicial decision making blends natural
law and natural rights principles, based on a scientific grounding of the law. Wilson’s science of law is ultimately a scientifically-informed understanding of precedent and judicial reasoning. Where the three competing interpretations of how judges
should decide go wrong is in viewing the act of decision making
as having to fall exclusively into a single intellectual camp. This
requirement is inconsistent with what is generally regarded as
the fundamental starting point to the study of American political thought. A single body of philosophy cannot accurately
explain or describe the American political thinking as Americans draw on multiple, often contradicting, intellectual traditions (Gibson 2007, 130-164; Gibson 2006, 7-63).Wilson’s
multi-dimensional concept of popular sovereignty, as well as
his understanding of what judges should have recourse to when
making decisions serves as the perfect example of how multiple
influences affect the political thought of our Founding Fathers.

Zink, James R. 2009. The Language of Liberty and Law: James Wilson on America’s Written Constitution. The American Political Science Review. Vol. 103, No. 3: American Political Science Association
(August)
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Endnotes
1 Wilson was also a strong advocate for a Council of Revision, which
would create a larger check on the legislative power when creating
laws by determining whether or not a particular piece of legislature
was consistent with the Constitution. Having this check would ensure that no law passed by the legislature would be unconstitutional.
However, the Council of Revision was eventually rejected by the delegates at the Constitutional Convention.
2 This limitation on the Supreme Court’s power is best seen in the
case of Marbury v. Madison 1803. In Marbury, the Supreme Court
denied cert because Marbury had filed for original jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court only has the power of appellate jurisdiction, therefore
making Marbury’s claim outside the sphere of the Supreme Court’s
jurisdiction.
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